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  • emvy

    nagyúr

    válasz emvy #34 üzenetére

    Kozben megtalaltam a Wikipedian is, ha valakit meg erdekel:

    Another potential security vulnerability in using asymmetric keys is the possibility of a "man-in-the-middle" attack, in which the communication of public keys is intercepted by a third party (the "man in the middle") and then modified to provide different public keys instead. Encrypted messages and responses must also be intercepted, decrypted, and re-encrypted by the attacker using the correct public keys for different communication segments, in all instances, so as to avoid suspicion. This attack may seem to be difficult to implement in practice, but it is not impossible when using insecure media (e.g. public networks, such as the Internet or wireless forms of communications) – for example, a malicious staff member at Alice or Bob's Internet Service Provider (ISP) might find it quite easy to carry out. In the earlier postal analogy, Alice would have to have a way to make sure that the lock on the returned packet really belongs to Bob before she removes her lock and sends the packet back. Otherwise, the lock could have been put on the packet by a corrupt postal worker pretending to be Bob, so as to fool Alice.

    One approach to prevent such attacks involves the use of a certificate authority, a trusted third party responsible for verifying the identity of a user of the system. This authority issues a tamper-resistant, non-spoofable digital certificate for the participants. Such certificates are signed data blocks stating that this public key belongs to that person, company, or other entity. This approach also has its weaknesses – for example, the certificate authority issuing the certificate must be trusted to have properly checked the identity of the key-holder, must ensure the correctness of the public key when it issues a certificate, and must have made arrangements with all participants to check all their certificates before protected communications can begin. Web browsers, for instance, are supplied with a long list of "self-signed identity certificates" from PKI providers – these are used to check the bona fides of the certificate authority and then, in a second step, the certificates of potential communicators. An attacker who could subvert any single one of those certificate authorities into issuing a certificate for a bogus public key could then mount a "man-in-the-middle" attack as easily as if the certificate scheme were not used at all. Despite its theoretical and potential problems, this approach is widely used. Examples include SSL and its successor, TLS, which are commonly used to provide security for web browsers, for example, so that they might be used to securely send credit card details to an online store.

    Ugyebar itt a potencialis MITM es a trusted 3rd party is a Google. Nyilvan eleg latvanyosan le lehetne vele bukni, ha megprobalkoznanak ezzel, tehat gyakorlatban en nem tartom ezt realis veszelynek (egy kulonallo csatornan A es B egyeztetnek a publikus kulcsokat, es egybol kiderulne a dolog).

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  • Ribi

    nagyúr

    válasz emvy #34 üzenetére

    MITM ha jól sejtem leginkább csak SSL és hasonló szimetrikus kulcsokkal megvalósítható, mert ha én betitkosítom A publikus kulcsával a levelet, azt vissza csak A privát kulcsával lehet fejteni. Emiatt bárki tud neked levelet küldeni, de elolvasni azokat csak te tudod. MITM emiatt emailben nem igazán lehetséges. Cserébe ha már itt tartunk MITB valószínűbb, mert ugye az google termék lesz, így hiába titkosítasz bármit bármivel, ha a browser necces akkor hiába az egész. :U

    Email támadások esetén nyilván megy a MITM, de ebben az esetben rohadtul nem érdekli a küldött levél tartalma, csak az, hogy a küldött emailben legyen valami csúnyaság. De ez meg már víruskergető téma, nem levél tartalom biztonság.

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