Hozzászólok Aktív témák

  • tomazin

    addikt

    Kinek lenne ebben nagyobb gyakorlata, hogyan lehetne megadóztatni a nemzetközi cégeket, mint a 4ből az egyiknek aki pont nekik dolgozik?

  • tha_answer

    tag

    https://econfip.org/policy-brief/taxing-multinational-corporations-in-the-21st-century/#

    "Taxing multinationals in a globalized world

    The good news is that there is a way to tax multinationals in a way that addresses both tax competition for real activity and for paper profits. At the country level, the corporate income tax base can be made largely inelastic by apportioning the global, consolidated profits of firms proportionally to where they make their sales. Concretely, if Apple sells 20% of its products in the United States, the U.S. federal government would say that 20% of Apple’s global profits are taxable in the United States. This would put an end to profit shifting because firms cannot affect the location of their customers (they can’t move their customers to Bermuda; and if they try to pretend that they make a disproportionate fraction of their sales to low-tax places, this form of tax avoidance is easy to detect and anti-abuse rules can be applied). This would also put an end to competition for real activity, because in such a system there is no incentive for firms to move capital or labor to low-tax places; the location of production becomes irrelevant for tax purposes.
    U.S. states have successfully taxed companies operating in multiple states this way for decades, so this is a tried and tested proposal. For instance, California, like all other States with a corporate tax, uses an apportionment formula to determine what fraction of corporate profits are taxable in California. Since 2013, apportionment is based on sales only: if a company makes 10% of its U.S. sales in California, then 10% of its U.S. profits are taxable in California (at a rate of 8.84% currently). Before 2013, the formula was more complicated, with apportionment based not only on the fraction of sales, but also the fraction of employment and tangible capital assets used in California by the corporation. Over time, the majority of U.S. States have gradually adopted apportionment formulas based mostly or only on sales. Other countries with sub-federal corporate taxes, such as Canada and Germany, use similar apportionment mechanisms. With globalization, countries are becoming more and more like local governments within a broader federation; and therefore using apportionment formulas like local governments have done for a long time is logical way forward.
    Apportioning the global profits proportionally to where sales are made can be done unilaterally. International cooperation is always preferable, but because tax havens derive large benefits from tax competition, it is unlikely they will ever agree to meaningful changes to the international tax system (at least absent large economic sanctions). But any country is free to set its tax base as it sees fit; and not all countries need to use the same base (e.g., the same apportionment formula) for the corporate tax to work well. U.S. States have for a long time used different formulas (with some States such as Massachusetts apportioning profits based not only on the fraction of sales made in Massachusetts, but also the fraction of the capital stock in and wages paid in Massachusetts).
    This reform of the corporate tax illustrates a simple yet powerful idea, namely that globalization and redistributive taxation are not incompatible. The corporate income is progressive, because although it is typically levied at a flat rate, equity ownership (and hence corporate profits) are very unequally distributed (see, e.g., Saez and Zucman, 2016 for evidence and equity—and more broadly wealth—concentration in the United States). The corporate tax reaches wealthy individuals regardless of whether profits are distributed to shareholders or retained within corporations. For example, although Facebook does not pay dividends, it pays corporate income tax (and would pay much more with sales apportionment of Facebook’s profits), and hence Mark Zuckerberg—Facebook’s main shareholder—indirectly pays taxes this way."

    [ Szerkesztve ]

  • Kopi31415

    félisten

    "A tervezet a hagyományos fizikai jelenlétre vonatkozó feltételek kiegészítéseként a tényleges piaci jelenlét, vagyis a végfelhasználók részére történt szolgáltatásnyújtás vagy termékértékesítés alapján az érintett országoknak jogalapot teremtene a joghatóságuk alatt keletkezett és oda allokálható jövedelmek megadóztatására"

    És mi határozza meg, hogy hol szolgáltat? Milyen IP címekről érhető el az oldal? Milyen nyelven van? Milyen országban vállal hivatalosan szolgáltatást? Milyen országbeli regisztrációkat fogad?
    És itt konkrétan olyan szolgáltatásokra gondolok, mint pl. Netflix.

    Part to Part | Status:122% completed | Estimated time remaining:1193hr 2min 30sec ----- Converting Data | Status: 425% completed | Estimated time remaining: 1193hr46sec

  • Kopi31415

    félisten

    Senki nem tudja megtiltani az Applenak, hogy tőle ne egy bermudai almaharapó kft. vegye meg az összes termékét, amit aztán tovább szállít és ad el az iBoltoknak az USA-ban.

    Part to Part | Status:122% completed | Estimated time remaining:1193hr 2min 30sec ----- Converting Data | Status: 425% completed | Estimated time remaining: 1193hr46sec

  • tha_answer

    tag

    "U.S. states have successfully taxed companies operating in multiple states this way for decades, so this is a tried and tested proposal."

  • Kopi31415

    félisten

    Az ÁFA helyi megfelelöje terén nekem nem tünik olyan siekresnek. Plusz egészen már Eg országon belül intézni valamit, mint országok között.

    Part to Part | Status:122% completed | Estimated time remaining:1193hr 2min 30sec ----- Converting Data | Status: 425% completed | Estimated time remaining: 1193hr46sec

  • tha_answer

    tag

    akarat kerdese.
    az offshore problema legnagyobb reszet az angolszasz orszagok pontosabban usa es london el tudna intezni ha akarna.

Hozzászólok Aktív témák